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What is a proof? What should it be?
Christoph Benzmu¨ller
Abstract. Mathematical proofs should be paired with formal proofs, whenever feasible.
What is a proof? Is it the rigorous but typically rather unintuitive formal derivation
of a new “truth” from its premises using accurately defined rules of inference? Or
is it an artful communication act in which the beautiful structures underlying a new
mathematical insight are revealed to peer experts in such a way that they can easily see
and accept it, and even gain further inspiration?
The former notion, referred to as formal proof, is primarily concerned with log-
ical rigor and soundness. Intuition and beauty is still a secondary concern, if at all.
Formal proofs have recently attained increased, albeit quite controversial, attention in
mathematics. This interest has been triggered by successful applications of modern
theorem proving technology to challenging mathematical verification and reasoning
tasks. Some of the settled problems are of such a kind, that human cognition alone has
apparently reached its limits for attacking them. Respective examples include:
1. Hales’ [13] verification of his proof of the Kepler conjecture within the proof
assistant HOL Light: A board of expert reviewers of the Annals of Mathematics
had previously surrendered this complex task, but Hales and his team mastered it
in interaction with a proof assistant system. As the main result, the computer sys-
tem produced a formal proof that is now independently verifiable — by humans
and/or (other) computer programs.
2. Heule & Kullmann’s [15] automated solution of the Pythagorean Triples Prob-
lem: In this work an open mathematical problem was solved with fully auto-
mated SAT solving technology. The formal proof that was generated by the
computer program is of enormous size (about 200TB). Nevertheless, it is still in-
dependently verifiable (at least by machines). This line of research has recently
been continued by an automatic solution for Schur Number Five [14].
While some mathematicians embrace this new, computer-supported alternative math-
ematics, many others still strongly reject it and ask: “Is this still maths?”.
Those latter, disapproving mathematicians typically point to the virtues of tradi-
tional mathematical proofs, which, in contrast to formal proofs, focus on intuition,
beauty and explanatory power. However, such proofs often lack logical rigor, and the
exact dependencies and the precisely required inference principles may remain vague
— but these weaknesses are considered subordinate to human intuition and abstract-
level understanding. Moreover, the assessment of mathematical proofs is traditionally
also handled quite differently from those of formal proofs: it is organized as a kind
of social/voting process in which a sufficient number of peers has to be convinced of
the new result for it to be generally established. It is thus of little surprise that many
mathematical proofs do in fact suffer from mostly minor, but occasionally also major,
technical flaws that have escaped the human eye. Most of these errors, I claim, would
have been revealed in a formal proof verification process.
Both notions of proof thus constitute strong antipodes, with orthogonal pros and
cons, and with opposing goals. Traditional mathematical proofs are made for, and
consumed by, humans, while formal proofs are predominantly generated with, and
consumed by, machines.
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So, what should a proof be? In my opinion it should ideally be both, whenever fea-
sible, namely a human-oriented traditional proof accompanied by a machine-oriented
formal proof. There might be situations though in which only one of both notions
can be provided (in principle or for the time being). For example, it is still unclear
whether the 200TB proof generated in (2) can be replaced by, respectively accompa-
nied with, a human-oriented, short and intuitive proof — simply because there might
be none. In fact, due to the sprouting complexity in an increasingly technified world,
we can actually expect a soaring number of analogous challenges to emerge in the fu-
ture, in particular, in areas such as computer science and artificial intelligence. Think
e.g. about the assessment and verification of critical software components in emerging
intelligent systems. We cannot even expect beautiful and insightful proofs to generally
exist in such contexts, since the systems to be assessed might simply be too complex
while at the same time ill-designed or relying on ill-defined foundations. But can we,
or should we, therefore capitulate from verification attempts, only because human in-
tuitive proofs or refutations are not easily feasible in a particular application context?
Clearly not! I am convinced that we even have the duty to take on such challenges. I am
thus strongly against upholding a restricted, traditional notion of mathematical proof
only, since societal responsibility precludes such a luxury position. Also mathemat-
ics is facing increasingly complex problems, whose solution and subsequent solution-
verification will require techniques beyond traditional practice. Examples (i) and (ii)
above are just some first witnesses of this kind (in fact, there have been other examples
before, including the four color theorem [3, 12]). Formal proofs therefore should, if
not must, adopt a more central role, in mathematics and beyond.
However, vice versa, I clearly also argue for coupling formal proofs with additional
human-intuitive proofs whenever feasible. Explainability, transparency and intuition
must remain virtues of highest priority, not only in mathematics, but in particular in
topical, emerging areas such as autonomous intelligent machines. I am thus against
preferring one notion over the other. Instead, both notions of proof should be coupled
pari passu, whenever possible. And in the long run, the raised trustworthiness and
beauty of a combined approach will justify the required additional resource efforts.
Note that I have avoided the phrase integrating mathematical proofs and formal
proofs. Instead, I have talked about pairings or couplings only. While I do not rule
out that a proper integration of both notions of proofs can eventually be achieved (and
there has been relevant research in the past, see e.g. [10, 4] and the references therein),
considerable scientific progress is still needed to get there. The overall challenge, how-
ever, appears AI-complete, since it includes a seamless, semantical integration of nat-
ural language, diagrams and formula language.
My own research is developing and applying pairings of formal proof and human-
intuitive proof in an inspiring novel direction not mentioned so far: computational
metaphysics. In collaboration with colleagues, I have demonstrated that also in meta-
physics (and ethics and argumentation) formal poofs have a lot to contribute, including
the revelation of philosophically relevant new insights [9]. For example, my higher-
order theorem prover LEO-II [8] revealed an unnoticed inconsistency in Go¨del’s mod-
ern variant of the ontological argument for the existence of God, while Scott’s emen-
dation of Go¨del’s argument (and the consistency of the emended premises) was auto-
matically verified. These applications in metaphysics were enabled by a new, generic
technique in which classical higher-order logic (HOL), as supported in modern theo-
rem provers and proof assistants, is utilized as a universal meta-logic in which differ-
ent target logics can be semantically embedded. In metaphysics we can thus encode
arguments in higher-order modal logic (as e.g. assumed by Go¨del for his ontological
argument), while in category theory we may want to work with free first-order logic,
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which is suitable for addressing partiality issues in a proper way [7]. With the new
technique, existing theorem provers for HOL become readily applicable in all these
application contexts [6].
So what is needed to further develop and foster the utilization of an integrated notion
of formal and mathematical proof in future applications? It is a next generation of
highly qualified experts that master both, the beauty and intuition of mathematical
proofs and the technicality challenges of formal proofs. Unfortunately, however, this
vision has not been picked up yet by mathematicians to the extend that the deductions
systems community was hoping for (see e.g. the discussions in [1, 2, 5, 11]).
The recent work by Marco David, Benjamin Stock, Abhik Pal and their fellow stu-
dents at Jacobs University, however, provides good new hope. While their ongoing
verification project [17] on Matiyasevich’s proof of Hilbert’s tenth problem is in many
ways related to the Flyspeck project, albeit on a smaller scale, there is also a significant
difference which I personally find particularly encouraging. While Hales, to my best
knowledge, received substantial support already early on by expert members from the
deduction system community, the maths students were entering their formal encod-
ing project without prior knowledge of the proof assistant technology they employed
(Isabelle/HOL [16]). They initially also had little knowledge about the logical foun-
dations of that system and for a long time into the project they worked without any
expert support. And yet, they still mastered the challenge and got a very long way by
working with the proof assistant on their own. This provides good evidence for the
maturity proof assistant technology has meanwhile achieved. For a next generation of
talented maths students, the required expertise acquisition can obviously be handled
autonomously, while for the majority of more matured/establishedmathematicians this
may not pose a realistic and sufficiently attractive scenario anymore.
To conclude, I am convinced that an integrated notion of formal and intuitive math-
ematical proof is indispensable for a wide range of topical, future applications across
disciplines, and there is encouraging recent evidence that this is practically feasible.
Society cannot afford to postpone further research and developments in this area, with
or without the support of traditional mathematics. Whether and when mathematicians
are wholeheartedly embracing the new developments is a subordinate but neverthe-
less relevant question, since their support could trigger a substantial increase of much
needed research and infrastructure investments.
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